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aw differences in educational attainment by 
family income are dramatic.  For example, 
Ellwood and Kane (2000) find that among the 
high school graduating class of 1992, those with 
parents in the top income quartile have a 30 
percentage point higher probability of attending a 
post-secondary institution than those from the bottom 
income quartile. However, most of this gap disap-
pears after controlling for adolescent achievement or 
cognitive test scores and family background 
(Cameron and Heckman 1998, 2001; Carneiro and 
Heckman 2002; Ellwood and Kane 2000). This has 
led many economists to conclude that short-term 
borrowing constraints at college ages are not an im-
portant determinant of college attendance and 
completion decisions. That is, increasing credit 
access for college students is unlikely to affect 
college enrollment rates by more than a few 
percentage points and will do little to reduce the 
attendance gaps by family income or race.  By the 
end of high school, it may be too late to help many 
youths from disadvantaged backgrounds. It appears 
that, because they are ill-prepared to do so, poor and 
minority youths choose to attend college at lower 
rates than wealthier white youths.
2 
 
Indeed, there is a wealth of indirect evidence that skill 
investments are complementary over the life cycle and 
that a failure to make adequate investments during 
early childhood years reduces incentives in later years 
to invest through college attendance or high school 
completion (Cunha et al., forthcoming). The impor-
tance of cognitive-achievement scores in determining 
high-school-dropout or college-attendance rates is one 
indicator of the complementarity of early and late in-
vestments. Using data on children from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), figures 1 and 
2 show the importance of adolescent achievement 
scores, as measured by a combined math and reading 
Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) score at 
ages 13–14, in determining high-school-dropout and 
college-attendance rates.  After controlling for family 
background and family income (measured when chil-
dren were ages 15–18), a one-standard-deviation 
increase in PIAT scores at ages 13–14 is associated 
with a 12 percentage point decline in high-school-
dropout rates and a 15 percentage point increase in 
college attendance.  
 
This study investigates the role of family income and 
borrowing constraints in determining early invest-
ments in children and youth achievement scores.  As 
figure 3 shows, youths raised in families in the 
bottom third of the income distribution are much less 
likely to be among the highest PIAT test scorers (at 
ages 13–14) than are those in middle- and high-
income groups.
3 While more than 50 percent of all 
13- to 14-year-olds in the top tercile of the income 
distribution are in the top third of the test-score 
distribution, fewer than 20 percent of those in the 
bottom income tercile managed such scores. These 
findings raise the natural question: To what extent do 
family borrowing constraints during early childhood 
and adolescence influence early investments in chil-
dren, cognitive achievement levels, and ultimately 
college attendance and completion? 
 
While a number of studies have recently examined 
the effects of credit constraints on college-going 
behavior (see Carniero and Heckman 2002 for a 
summary of the empirical literature), very little 
attention has been paid to the role of borrowing 
constraints when children are younger.
4 Yet it seems 
possible that constraints at early ages play a more 
important role in determining investment decisions    
for a number of reasons. First, most empirical studies 
indicate that early investments in children produce 
high long-term payoffs (see Karoly et al., 1998 or 
Blau and Currie, forthcoming, and references 
therein). Randomized studies of early intervention 
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Figure 1: Fraction of Youth Who Drop Out of High School

















Figure 2: Fraction of Youth Who Attend College 




















and preschool programs for disadvantaged children 
have estimated large benefit–cost ratios, suggesting 
that many poor families are not making investments 
in their children even though those investments 
would more than pay for themselves in the long run.  
Not only are children able to learn quickly when they 
are young, but early learning begets later learning as 
emphasized by Cunha et al. (forthcoming). Second, 
recent studies have shown that increases in family 
income lead to increases in the test scores of 
adolescents and young children (e.g., Blau 1999; 
Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997; Levy and Duncan 
1999; and Dahl and Lochner 2005). A few of these 
studies suggest that family income is more important 
at earlier ages (e.g., Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997; 
Levy and Duncan 1999). Third, parents age with their 
children and, as both children and parents age, 
parental resources tend to increase with the 
accumulation of human capital and the associated rise 
in earnings. Fourth, despite generous government  
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Figure 3: Fraction of Youth in Top PIAT Test Score Tercile 


















student-loan programs for college-age students and 
their families in the United States and other 
developed countries, governments have not 
traditionally offered loans to parents of young 
children to help finance earlier human-capital 
investments. 
 
While the direct costs of public elementary and 
secondary education are fully subsidized, a good 
education through high school is not free.  In many 
U.S. communities, parents must choose between 
sending their child to poor public schools and paying 
for their child to attend better private schools. Alter-
natively, parents may choose between high-cost 
communities with good public schools and low-cost 
neighborhoods with poor ones. Other investments in 
young children can also be costly. Preschool 
programs in the United States can cost as much as 
attendance at a top university. While the government 
does not fully neglect poor preschool-age children, 
the quality of publicly provided preschool programs 
(e.g., Head Start) is far below what it could be (Zigler 
1994; Blau and Currie, forthcoming). Expenditures 
on computers and books also add up. Finally, 
parental time is an important, yet costly, input that 
poor parents may be unable to afford. 
 
In order to better understand the role of borrowing 
constraints, we distinguish between intergenerational 
borrowing constraints, which would prevent parents 
from borrowing against their children’s future 
earnings, and intragenerational  borrowing con-
straints, which would prevent individuals from 
borrowing against their own future income. Intui-
tively, the former implies that only the present value 
of lifetime parental income affects child success, 
while the latter implies that the timing of parental 
income (over the life cycle) also matters. We use data 
on children from the NLSY to test for the latter form 
of constraint, estimating the effects of family income 
at different ages of the child on the math and reading 
achievement of those children at ages 5–14. We in-
terpret evidence that the timing of income matters as 
evidence that intragenerational  borrowing con-
straints distort investment decisions.
5 
 
INTERGENERATIONAL AND INTRAGENERATIONAL 
BORROWING CONSTRAINTS 
 
Parents may be intergenerationally constrained from 
borrowing against their children’s future income; that 
is, parents may not be able to pass on debts to their 
children. This is more like a generational budget 
constraint than a borrowing constraint, but it does 
imply that family income may affect child achieve-
ment. Importantly, this type of constraint, if binding, 
suggests that the present discounted value of lifetime 
family income will be an important determinant of 
child achievement.  However, if parents can save and 
borrow against their own future earnings, the timing 
of their income should not be important.    
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The second, stronger constraint—an intragenera-
tional one—more closely matches the standard idea 
of a borrowing constraint. Parents may be unable to 
borrow against their own future earnings in order to 
smooth consumption or to make investments in their 
children at young ages. If parents are borrowing 
constrained in this way, the timing of their income 
will be important. That is, constrained parents who 
earn a smaller share of their lifetime income at 
younger ages will tend to invest less in their children 
when they are young than will parents who earn a 
larger share of their income early on. 
 
The first type of constraint is, in theory, easy to test. 
Do children from wealthier families perform better 
than children from poorer families? In practice, 
however, this type of test is difficult to implement 
since innate abilities of children may be correlated 
with the abilities and lifetime earnings of their par-
ents. Additionally, rich parents and poor parents may 
differ in many unobservable ways that have little to 
do with income.  This problem has plagued past work 
on credit constraints and college-going behavior as 
discussed in Carniero and Heckman (2002). So, while 
we think that intergenerational constraints are almost 
certainly important, we focus attention on the effects 
of intragenerational constraints. 
 
Testing for intragenerational borrowing constraints 
relies on examining how the timing of income 
matters conditional on the discounted value of 
lifetime income.  This amounts to comparing the test 
scores of children in families with the same total 
lifetime earnings but with different income profiles.  
If families are unaffected by borrowing constraints, 
children from families who earn a larger share of 
their income early on should perform as well as 
children from families who earn more of their income 
late in their careers. If borrowing constraints are 
binding, the first set of children should perform better 
than the second. For example, in the absence of 
intragenerational constraints, a child raised in a 
family that earns $20,000 for the first 10 years of a 
child’s life and then $40,000 for the next 10 years 
should perform as well as a child raised in a family 
earning $40,000 for the first ten years and $20,000 
the next ten (ignoring inflation and discounting). If 
intragenerational constraints are important, the latter 
child should perform better. By holding lifetime 
income constant, we can reduce concerns that a 
positive correlation between parents’ and children’s 
abilities will bias our results.
6 
 
It is important to recognize that income earned earlier 
should be worth more in a present-value sense. That 
is, income earned today is worth 1 + r times income 
earned next year (in the absence of credit con-
straints), where r is the annual interest rate. It is 
necessary to account for this when examining the 
effects of income timing. Therefore, we discount in-
come earned by the family so that it is measured in 
present-value terms as of the child’s birth year.
7  
After this adjustment, the absence of intragenera-
tional borrowing constraints suggests that the timing 
of income should be irrelevant conditional on the dis-
counted present value of lifetime family income. 
 
We examine three types of evidence on the 
importance of income timing. First, we test whether 
the slope of a family’s income profile significantly 
affects test scores conditional on the discounted 
present value of lifetime family income over a long 
time span. Second, we estimate the effects of past 
income on children’s achievement test scores to see 
whether income earned at a child’s earlier ages has a 
different effect on test scores than does income 
earned at later ages.  Third, we estimate whether fu-
ture income has the same effect on test scores as do 
past and current income.  The first test examines the 
role of income timing over the past, present, and 
future; the second compares the effects of income 
earned at different points in the past; and the third 
compares the effects of past income with future 
income.  As we next show, these tests point to the 
existence of intragenerational borrowing constraints 
(as well as intergenerational constraints): family 
income earned at a child’s earlier ages has signifi-
cantly larger effects on a child’s test scores than does 
income earned at later ages. 
 
EVIDENCE ON BORROWING CONSTRAINTS AND 
CHILD ACHIEVEMENT 
 
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
 
We use data on children from the NLSY and the 
main NLSY sample of mothers. These data are ideal 
for studying the effects of family income on children 
because they enable us to link children to their 
mothers and follow families over many years.  For 
children, biannual measures of family background 
and cognitive and behavioral assessments are  
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available from 1986 to 2000. Detailed longitudinal 
demographic, educational, and labor market 
information for the mothers is available annually 
from 1979 through 1994 and biannually thereafter. 
Additionally, a widely used measure of cognitive 
ability—the Armed Forces Qualifying Test 
(AFQT)—is available for mothers in the NLSY. The 
NLSY oversamples minority and poor white families, 
which provides a larger sample of the families more 
likely to face borrowing constraints. We use data 
drawn from more than 7,000 interviewed children 
born to over 3,500 interviewed mothers. 
 
Since family-income measures are available annually 
from 1979 to 1994 and biannually thereafter, for 
children born after 1979, we were able to compile an 
income history for almost every year since birth. Our 
empirical analysis first uses the Consumer Price 
Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U) to deflate all 
income measures to year-2000 dollars. We then 
created two measures of family income that we use 
for our empirical analysis. The first simply discounts 
income at each age of the child back to the first year 
of that child’s life, using a 5 percent interest rate. 
This puts all income measures for a child on an equal 
basis for comparison—a dollar at age 10 should be 
just as valuable as a dollar at age one after 
discounting in this way. The second income measure 
we created is a measure of average “lifetime 
income,” which is simply the average of all 
discounted income measures for all observed periods 
from birth to the final survey date. This measure is 
fixed for each child and does not vary over time. 
 
We analyze PIAT math and reading scores, collected 
biannually from 1986 to 2000, for children ages   
5–14. The assessments measure mathematics ability,  
oral-reading ability, and the ability to derive meaning 
from printed words. To simplify our exposition, we 
focus on a combined math and reading test score, 
which places a weight of 50 percent on the math 
score and 25 percent each on of the reading- 
comprehension and reading-recognition scores. To 
make these scores more easily interpretable, we 
created standardized test scores with a mean of zero 





mpirical Tests of Intragenerational Borrowing Constraints 
In the absence of credit constraints, the slope of a 
family’s life-cycle-income profile should have no 
affect on child achievement after controlling for the 
discounted present value of lifetime income.  The 
presence of intragenerational borrowing constraints 
suggests that children raised in families that obtain 
more of their income earlier will perform better; thus, 
the slope of income profiles should be negatively 
related to achievement.  We test this proposition by 
regressing PIAT scores at all observed ages on the 
discounted present value of lifetime family income 
and the slope of family-income profiles (as well as a 
Table 1: Effects of Lifetime Income and the Slope of Family-Income Profiles on PIAT Scores 
 
                             1                     2       3 
      
Slope of Family-Income Profiles  ￿0.1689  ￿0.1187  ￿0.1629 
    (0.0838)    (0.0796)    (0.0793) 
      
Average ￿Lifetime Income￿    0.2199    0.0964    0.0624 
    (0.0062)    (0.0065)    (0.0070) 
Controls:      
  Basic Background Measures    X  X 
 Additional  Controls      X 
 
Notes: 
(1) Income is measured in $10,000 and is discounted at an annual rate of r = 0.05. 
(2) All specifications control for the child￿s age, race, and gender and for the mother￿s age. 
(3) Average ￿lifetime income￿ refers to the discounted present value of all available income 
measures after birth of the child. 
(4) Basic background measures include the mother￿s education, AFQT score, and family 
background (foreign born, rural residence at age 14, living with both parents at age 14); the highest 
grade completed by the child￿s grandparents; and year dummies. 
(5) Additional controls include the number of adults and children/dependents in the household, 
current marital status of the mother, age and education of the spouse, and whether or not the 
mother is currently living with her parents.  
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variety of family background characteristics). These 
results are presented in table 1 for a few different 
specifications. Consistent with intragenerational 
credit constraints, we generally find negative effects 
of the slope on children; although, the estimates are 
not always statistically significant.
9 To interpret these 
estimates, it is useful to note that incomes grow about 
$2,300 more per year for those with high earnings 
growth (90
th percentile) relative to those with low 
earnings growth (10
th percentile).  The most conser-
vative estimates in table 1 suggest that this difference 
is associated with a 0.027 standard deviation 
difference in PIAT test scores. 
 
We next estimate the effects of family income earned 
at all earlier ages (allowing those effects to vary by 
age) on PIAT scores, controlling for a variety of 
individual and family background characteristics as 
well as average discounted lifetime income. Here, we 
are interested in determining whether the effect of 
income on subsequent PIAT scores depends on the 
age at which that income was received. In the 
absence of intragenerational borrowing constraints, 
income earned at all ages (once appropriately 
discounted) should have the same effect on child 
achievement. By contrast, when borrowing con-
straints are binding for some families, income 
received at earlier ages should have a greater effect 
than income received at later ages. 
 
We explore the effects of income at different ages 
assuming that the effects of income on a child’s test 
score depend linearly on the age at which income is 
earned and the age at which the achievement test is 
taken. Specifically, we assume that the effects of 
family income for child i earned at age j, Ii,,j, on an 












In this case,  2 α tells us how income earned at 
different ages affects subsequent child test scores, 
while  3 α  tells us at what ages test scores respond 
most to changes in past income.  Table 2 reports   
Table 2: Effects of Past Income on PIAT Scores 
 
                   1        2     3              4 
       
Long-Term  Effects:       
  α1  ￿0.0140 ￿0.0102 ￿0.0101      0.0260 
    (0.0031)    (0.0038)    (0.0064)    (0.0098) 
  α2  ￿0.0013 ￿0.0011 ￿0.0011  ￿0.0020 
    (0.0006)    (0.0008)    (0.0008)    (0.0008) 
  α3     0.0027    0.0025    0.0025  ￿0.0019 
    (0.0004)    (0.0005)    (0.0006)    (0.0011) 
       
Temporary Effect of Current Income    ￿0.0075  ￿0.0075  ￿0.0044 
      (0.0136)    (0.0139)    (0.0139) 
       
Avg. ￿Lifetime Income￿      ￿0.0006  ￿0.3610 
        (0.0272)    (0.0785) 
Avg. ￿Lifetime Income￿ * Current Age          0.0476 
          (0.0097) 
 
Notes: 
(1) Long-term effect of income at age J on child PIAT score at age A is α1 + α2J + α3A. 
(2) Income is measured in $10,000 and is discounted at an annual rate of r = 0.05. 
(3) Average ￿lifetime income￿ refers to the discounted present value of all available income measures 
after birth of the child. 
(4) All specifications control for the child￿s age, race, and gender; mother￿s age, AFQT score, education, 
family background (foreign born, rural residence at age 14, living with both parents at age 14), marital 
status, and the age and education of her spouse; the highest grade completed by the child’s 
grandparents; number of adults and children/dependents in the household; whether or not the mother is 
currently living with her parents; and year dummies.  
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Table 3: Effects of Past, Current, and Future Income on PIAT Scores 
 
         1                2          3 
      
Past and Current Income    0.1698    0.0850   0.0619 
   (0.0118)   (0.0114)  (0.0116) 
Future Income    0.0634    0.0221   0.0111 
   (0.0075)   (0.0072)  (0.0072) 
Controls:      
Basic Background Measures         X     X 
Additional Controls         X 
 
Notes: 
(1) Income is measured in $10,000 and is discounted at an annual rate of r = 0.05. 
(2) All specifications control for age, race, and gender of the child and age of the mother. 
(3) Basic background measures include the mother￿s education, AFQT score, and family 
background (foreign born, rural residence at age 14, living with both parents at age 14); the 
highest grade completed by the child￿s grandparents; and year dummies. 
(4) Additional controls include the number of adults and children/dependents in the household, 
current marital status of the mother, age and education of her spouse, and whether or not the 
mother is currently living with her parents. 
estimates of  1 α ,  2 α , and  3 α  using the NLSY data. 
Note that specifications 2–4 also account for an 
additional affect of current income on contemporane-
ous test scores, while specifications 3 and 4 
incorporate an independent effect of discounted 
lifetime income.
10 Focusing on the estimates of  2 α , 
which are all negative, we see that income earned at 
later ages has a smaller effect on subsequent child 
achievement scores than does income earned at ear-
lier ages. These estimates are statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level in specifications 1 and 4. Consistent 
with intragenerational borrowing constraints, the 
estimates suggest that shifting $10,000 in family 
income from age ten to the first year of a child’s life 
would increase subsequent test scores by .01 to .02 
standard deviations. More generally, the estimates 
suggest that past income has a positive effect on test 
scores at ages when the math and reading tests were 
administered (recall that tests were not administered 
to children before age five). The final specification 
suggests that lifetime income has growing effects as a 
child ages. That is, children from wealthier families 
(as measured by lifetime family income) perform 
increasingly well over time relative to children from 
less-fortunate families. 
 
The permanent-income hypothesis does not distin-
guish between income earned in the past and that 
earned in the future.  If individuals are reasonably 
certain about their future income prospects and 
unaffected by intragenerational borrowing con-
straints, income earned in the past, present, and future 
should all affect child test scores equally. Because the 
NLSY offers panel data over a long time period, it is 
possible to observe family income measured both 
before and after some tests are taken by children. 
Table 3 reports estimates from regressions of chil-
dren’s test scores on the present value of past and 
current income as well as the present value of all fu-
ture income. Columns 2 and 3 control for additional 
family-background variables as described earlier.  All 
of these estimates suggest that past and current in-
come have a significantly greater effect on test scores 
than does future income.  In the final column, the 
coefficient estimate for future income is not statisti-
cally different from zero, while the effect of past 
income is significantly positive at 0.06. This result is 
consistent with both intergenerational and intragen-
erational borrowing constraints. 
 
An obvious concern with this approach is uncertainty 
about future earnings. If individuals are completely 
uncertain about future income, actual realizations of 
that income process should have no effect on current 
decisions or outcomes, even if individuals are not 
borrowing constrained. However, since future income 
primarily represents income earned over the next one 
to five years, it seems unlikely that it is all that un-
certain for most families. To examine the role of 
uncertainty more formally, we ask whether the results  
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of table 3 hold for families with fairly predictable 
income profiles. To measure the predictability of in-
come, we estimate family-specific log income regres-
sions on age and age-squared, using all income 
observations after the child’s birth. We can then 
compute two potential measures of uncertainty (or 
variability, at least): (i) R
2 statistics that measure the 
fraction of the variance in log income that can be ex-
plained by age and age-squared alone, and (ii) the 
square root of the mean squared error (RMSE) from 
the regression. We separate individuals according to 
these measures of ability and separately run regres-
sions of children’s test scores on past/current and 
future family income. If the insignificant coefficient 
on future income in table 3 is due primarily to un-
certainty in future earnings, we expect that future 
income should have effects similar to past/current 
income among those with predictable earnings pro-
files (i.e., a high R
2 statistic or a low RMSE).  This is 
not the case. Using either measure of predictability, 
we find that past/current income has a significantly 
greater effect than future income among those with 
highly predictable income profiles.  In a combined 
measure that takes only those individuals with an R
2 
above 0.75 and those within the lowest quartile of 
RMSE, we find a more dramatic difference in coeffi-
cients on past/current and future income than we 
observe in table 3.
11 While predictability in an ex post 
sense (as implied by our measures) does not neces-
sarily imply a high degree of predictability in an ex 
ante sense (i.e., low uncertainty), these results are at 
least consistent with a more important role for in-





While none of these “tests” for intragenerational 
borrowing constraints are perfect, we view the com-
bination of all three sets of results as convincing 
evidence that some families with young children are 
constrained. At the very least, this evidence suggests 
that a better understanding of the role credit con-
straints play in determining families’ investments in 
children is warranted. 
 
The existence of intragenerational borrowing 
constraints suggests a positive role for government 
policy.  An inexpensive way to address such concerns 
may be to expand borrowing opportunities for fami-
lies with younger children.  Simply allowing young 
parents to borrow against their future earnings in 
order to pay for early-childhood-development 
programs or to finance private-school tuition should 
help alleviate intragenerational constraints.  For ex-
ample, a program modeled on the federal PLUS loan 
program for parents of college students could be ex-
tended to qualifying parents of younger children.  It 
is important to note, however, that expanding bor-
rowing opportunities in this way is not likely to 
address intergenerational borrowing constraints, 
which are also likely to be important. Dealing with 
poor parents’ inability to borrow against their 
children’s future earnings prospects is a more com-
plicated problem, which is likely to require a 
redistribution of resources from wealthier families to 
poorer families. Subsidies for early childhood pro-
grams and private schooling can alleviate problems 
with borrowing constraints, but they come at a 
sizeable cost.  To the extent that subsidies are granted 
to all children, wealthier families will tend to respond 
to such incentives by overspending on childhood in-
vestments at high costs to taxpayers.  Thus, a more 
efficient approach may require targeting subsidies to 
lower-income families that are most likely to be 
affected by borrowing constraints of one form or the 
other.  But this requires redistribution from the mid-
dle and upper classes to the less fortunate.  Such 
redistribution is not necessary to address intragenera-
tional borrowing constraints since they can be 





1 Lance Lochner based his remarks at the conference 
on this paper. 
 
2 See Carneiro and Heckman (2002) or Cunha et al. 
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3  Income measures are based on the discounted 
present value of family income from the child’s birth 
through age 12. Income is deflated using the 
Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers and dis-
counted at an annual rate of 5 percent.  See the data 
discussion in the “Evidence on Borrowing 
Constraints and Child Achievement” section for 
further details. 
 
4 Only recently have economists (e.g., Restuccia and 
Urrutia 2004; Caucutt and Lochner 2005; and Cunha 
and Heckman 2005) begun to consider multiple in-
vestment periods at young ages. However, only 
Caucutt and Lochner (2005) examine the role of early 
versus late borrowing constraints. Restuccia and 
Urrutia (2004) abstract from financial asset 
accumulation, while Cunha and Heckman (2005) shut 
down late borrowing altogether and do not focus on 
early borrowing constraints. 
 
5 If investments are perfectly substitutable over time, 
then the timing of income may not matter, even if a 
family is borrowing constrained. Strictly speaking, 
our tests offer a joint test against perfect substitut-
ability and borrowing constraints. 
 
6 One might expect more able parents to earn more of 
their income later because they invest more in their 
human capital early on. Then, if abler parents have 
abler children (a problem in the test of the inter-
generational constraint), children in families earning 
more of their income at later ages should be innately 
abler. This suggests that, in the absence of credit 
constraints, children from families earning their 
income earlier should perform worse, on average—
the opposite of the prediction based on credit 
constraints. Thus, a positive intergenerational 
correlation in ability may make it difficult to find 
evidence of intragenerational borrowing constraints. 
 
7  We use a discount rate of r = 0.05; however, other 
reasonable rates yield similar conclusions. 
 
8 See Caucutt and Lochner (2005) for a detailed 
discussion of the data. 
9 Estimates of the coefficient on the slope of income 
profiles are likely to be biased upward for two rea-
sons. First, since we only use income over a limited 
number of years in computing average lifetime 
income, this number will tend to be too low for those 
with a steeper slope relative to those with a flatter 
income profile. Because average lifetime income has 
a positive effect on children, this mismeasurement 
will tend to bias estimates of the coefficient on the 
slope of income profiles upward. However, this is 
unlikely to have much effect on our estimates since 
income far into the future is heavily discounted.  A 
second potential source of bias would arise if unob-
served differences across families are related to the 
slope of family income profiles. If family income 
profiles are rising because parents are accumulating 
human capital, then parents with the steepest earnings 
profiles will tend to accumulate the most human 
capital.  If those parents also tend to invest more in 
their children or if their investments are more 
productive, this will produce upwardly biased 
estimates of the coefficient on the slope of the 
income profile. 
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where Xi,a represents background characteristics for 
child i at age a, and  i I  represents average family in-
come from the child’s birth through the final period 
of observation.  The inclusion of Ii,a allows for an 
additional temporary effect of contemporaneous 
income on test scores, so  










11 For these individuals, the coefficient on past and 
current income is 0.149 (standard error of 0.053), 
while the coefficient on future income is –0.035 
(standard error of 0.030). 
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